University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Philosophy

1-2008

(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in
Customary International Law: A Hartian Approach
David Lefkowitz
University of Richmond, dlefkowi@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-facultypublications
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Political Theory Commons
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.
Recommended Citation
Lefkowitz, David, "(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary International Law: A Hartian Approach" (2008). Philosophy
Faculty Publications. 59.
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications/59

This Post-print Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary International Law: A Hartian
Approach
As traditionally conceived, the creation of customary international law gives rise to the
following chronological paradox. In order to create a new rule of customary international
law, states must act from the belief that the law already requires the conduct specified in
the rule.1 Yet until they have successfully created the new rule of customary law, the
conduct in question is not legally required. Thus the development of a new rule of
customary international law appears to be impossible.
Francois Geny suggests one way to avoid the chronological paradox, namely that
states falsely believe that the law already requires the conduct specified by the nascent
rule.2 In section I, I consider Geny’s solution to the chronological paradox, and a recent
criticism of it by Michael Byers.3 I contend that Byers’s criticism rests on
misunderstandings regarding both the nature of a legal system and the nature of
customary law formation, and so fails as a response to Geny. Yet Geny, too, fails to
grasp correctly the nature of customary law formation, and so he offers as a necessary
condition for the creation of a new customary rule what is only one possible means by
which such a rule may come to exist. Moreover, like all those who assert the existence of
the chronological paradox, Geny conflates the process of customary rule formation with
the process by which such rules become legally valid.
In section II, I argue that the creation of a new rule of customary international law
requires a two-step process; first, the development of a new customary rule, and second,
the incorporation of that rule into international law. The chronological paradox results
from the conflation of these two steps. Once we draw the appropriate conceptual

distinction, the chronological paradox dissolves. Confusion over this distinction arises, I
conclude, because in the international legal system, the same agents whose beliefs give
rise to the new customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of
recognition leads them to deem that new rule legally valid.
The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s
analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of
recognition. Yet Hart denied the existence of an international rule of recognition. Hart’s
argument for this conclusion, and so his belief that in certain respects international law
remains a primitive legal order, are set out in section III. I also consider there the
attempts by Anthony D’Amato, Thomas Franck, and G.J.H. van Hoof to refute Hart’s
doubts concerning international law, and argue that none succeed. In fact, none of these
theorists appear to grasp the primary reason behind Hart’s skepticism with respect to the
existence of an international rule of recognition.
In section IV, I offer a novel argument for the existence of a rule of recognition at
the base of customary international law. This argument turns on a distinction between
the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, a
distinction Hart elides. If successful, the view described in this section demonstrates that
customary international law does rest on a rule of recognition, albeit one that does not
serve the authoritative resolution function, and so the proposed solution to the
chronological paradox rests on a secure foundation.
I
The chronological paradox arises only if states must truly believe the law already requires
the conduct specified in some rule in order for that rule to become part of international
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law.4 One obvious way to defuse the paradox, then, is to argue that in order to create a
new rule of customary international law, states must falsely believe that the conduct
specified in the nascent customary rule is already legally required. This solution,
proposed by Francois Geny, keeps to the letter of the opinio juris sive necessitates
requirement, as traditionally conceived, since those states contributing to the creation of a
new customary rule believe that their conduct is already legally required. At the same
time, it avoids the chronological paradox by acknowledging that during the period of
creation, this belief on the part of states will be false. Thus the creation of a new
customary legal rule does not in fact require the impossibility that the rule in question
already be part of existing customary international law.
Michael Byers finds Geny’s proposed solution to the chronological paradox
unsatisfactory, ‘because it is inconceivable that an entire legal process – and since the
customary process provides the basis for the law of treaties, an entire legal system –
could be based on a persistent misconception.’5 Byers’s criticism rests, however, on two
misunderstandings. First, he fails to distinguish carefully between two types of
conventional rules that partly constitute the international legal system: (1) the
conventional rule of recognition employed by officials to determine whether particular
norms are legally valid (i.e. norms of the international legal system), and (2) primary
rules of customary international law.6 Second, Byers errs in asserting that Geny’s
proposal entails a persistent misconception on the part of states that they are bound by a
rule of customary law (or the rule of recognition). This claim evidences a lack of
understanding with respect to the nature of conventional rules. I develop each of these
points in turn.
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Following Hart, I suggest we understand a legal system to consist in the union of
primary and secondary rules, where primary rules address the behavior of subjects in the
legal system (e.g. what they ought to do), while secondary rules address the behavior of
officials in that legal system (e.g. instructing officials as to what counts as a rule of the
legal system).7 Byers suggests that the entire international legal system rests on the
‘customary process,’ with the implication that the opinio juris requirement applies even
to the most basic rule of the international legal system – the rule in virtue of which all
other rules count as legal, or what Hart calls the rule of recognition. But even if opinio
juris is a necessary condition for the creation of primary rules of customary international
law, it cannot be a condition for the creation or existence of the conventional rule of
recognition employed by officials in the international legal system. This is so because in
order for a given norm to qualify as a norm of the international legal system it must be
validated by the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition cannot validate itself,
however, and so there can be no legal obligation to adhere to the rule of recognition. The
rule of recognition is not itself law, but rather a conventional rule that makes law
possible.8 In subscribing to the rule of recognition that is the basis of the international
legal system, then, officials cannot correctly believe this rule to be law; such a belief is
conceptually incoherent. Thus even if correct, Geny’s solution to the chronological
paradox would not entail that the entire international legal system had its basis in a
‘persistent misconception’ on the part of legal officials.
Of course, it may be that neither international law as a whole, nor customary
international law, constitutes a legal system; one united by a rule of recognition. Rather,
it may it be comprised only of a set of legal norms; this is Hart’s view, as will become
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clear later in this paper. Even if this is the case, however, Byers still misspeaks when he
states that on Geny’s view, the creation of a new rule of customary international law
would require a persistent misconception on the part of states, namely the false belief that
the rule they wish to create already exists as a legal rule. For if at some point a sufficient
number of states come to hold a belief in the existence of some customary rule C, then in
virtue of their doing so that belief will be true. This follows from the nature of customary
(or social) rules; such rules exist amongst a group of actors if and only if most of them,
most of the time, believe that such a rule exists and applies to them, where that belief
manifests itself in both the conduct of the actors and their justification and/or criticism of
their own and others’ conduct. So, if at time t1 only states A and B believe that there
exists a social rule R in society S, according to which A and B have an obligation to φ,
while all the other members of S do not believe in the existence of R, then A and B
believe falsely. However, if at some later time t2, C, D, E, etc. also come to believe in
the existence of R, so that all or almost all members of S believe in R, then A and B will
no longer err when they believe that they have an obligation to φ in virtue of R.9
Crucially, A and B having a false belief that R applies to members of S can be
part of the mechanism whereby a sufficient number of members of S come to believe in
R so that it really does apply to members of S. There is nothing conceptually
problematic, then, in basing the creation of customary rules on actors falsely believing
that such rules already exist. It is true that the existence of customary rules cannot be
based on a false belief – that is, on a persistent misconception – but contrary to Byers’s
claim, Geny’s solution to the chronological paradox does not entail such a conclusion.
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Nevertheless, we ought to reject Geny’s solution for two reasons. First, he treats
as a necessary condition for the creation of a new customary rule what is only a sufficient
condition, in certain circumstances, for the creation of such a rule. While the having of
(initially) false beliefs in the existence of some customary rule R may be one way to
bring about a state of affairs in which a sufficient number of members of some society S
believe in the existence of R (and act accordingly) so that R is a customary rule in S, it is
not the only way to bring about this state of affairs. We can imagine a case in which R
has been imminent in the practices of members of S, and all (or at least most) of its
members come to believe in the existence of R at the same time. While the rule is only
imminent, no member of S believes in its existence, and since all members of S come to
believe in it at the same time, none of them ever believes falsely in R’s existence.
Alternatively, at t1 A and B may believe that R ought to be a rule for members of S, and
believe that the best way to bring such a rule into existence is to act as if R already exists
and applies to members of S.10 Their appeals to R to justify their own behavior, and to
criticize others, may lead to the widespread adoption of R by other members of S, so that
A and B no longer need believe that they ought to act as if R exists, but instead act on the
now true belief that R really does exist. As set out, this scenario does not require that A
and B ever hold a false belief regarding the existence of R, and yet it seems quite
plausible to think that a new customary rule could come to exist as the result of such a
process.
The second reason to reject Geny’s solution to the chronological paradox is that
he fails to distinguish the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist, and the
process whereby that rule comes to be law. As I demonstrate in the next section, once we
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draw this distinction we can dissolve the chronological paradox, rather than attempt, as
Geny does, to tweak the traditional understanding of the requirements for the creation of
a new rule of customary international law.
II
Most international legal theorists subscribe to the view that the creation of a new rule of
customary international law requires both state practice and opinio juris sive necessitates;
the belief that the law requires the practice in question. Byers writes that ‘it is clear that
something in addition to State practice should be necessary for customary international
law, for it is essential that one be able to distinguish between legally binding rules and
patterns of behavior which are not legally required.’11 This remark illustrates exactly the
confusion upon which the chronological paradox rests. For it conflates two separate
conceptual distinctions that must be drawn: the first is that between rule-guided behavior
and non-rule-guided behavior, while the second is between legal and non-legal rules.
While both distinctions turn on the beliefs had by certain agents, the beliefs in question
differ, and at least as a conceptual matter, the agents who must hold the beliefs can also
diverge.
Customary international law consists in customary rules. The first conceptual
question we must address, then, is what distinguishes convergent behavior that results
from adherence to a rule from convergent behavior that results from habit, or an overlap
of interests. Once again, Hart provides the answer: the convergent behavior of various
agents reflects the existence of a social rule when most of those agents take an internal
point of view with respect to that behavior.12 Agents adopt such a point of view when
they believe that they ought to conform their behavior to a certain standard, such that

7

behavior that deviates from the standard warrants criticism, and appeal to the standard
provides a sufficient justification for behavior that conforms to it. These normative
elements are absent in cases where convergent behavior results from habit, or an overlap
of interests. So for example, regular riders on a bus may sit in the same seats out of habit.
Should one of them choose to sit in a different seat, however, she will not necessarily be
criticizable for doing so. Likewise, the interests of different homeowners in diverse types
of flowers that happen to complement one another may result in a beautiful
neighborhood. But if one homeowner elects to plant non-complementary flowers, she
will not be criticizable for doing so, or at least not on the grounds that she has deviated
from a rule governing the planting of flowers in this neighborhood.13 In contrast, a
person who refuses to return to the dugout after the umpire has called a third strike on her
is liable to criticism, and crucially that criticism involves her failure to adhere to the
conventional rules of baseball.
Agents’ adoption of the internal point of view enables us to distinguish ruleguided behavior from convergent behavior that merely reflects habit or overlapping
interests. Yet the existence of a customary (or social) rule is only a necessary, not
sufficient, condition for the creation of a new rule of customary international law. For
even if there exist customary rules that govern a particular domain of state conduct, it
does not follow necessarily that the customary rules in question are legal ones. For
instance, ceremonial salutes at sea and the practice of exempting diplomatic vehicles
from parking prohibitions are both governed by non-legal customary rules.14 Rather,
what makes customary rules international law is adherence by officials in the
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international legal system to a rule of recognition that takes custom to be a source of valid
law (at least with respect to certain domains of conduct).15
The rule of recognition directs officials in a legal system to declare certain norms
legally valid, and so ones that ought to be adhered to by subjects of the legal system, and
applied by officials to settle disputes. Like customary rules concerned with agents’
conduct, the rule of recognition is a social rule. It exists and has the content it does only
as long as officials in the legal system adopt the internal point of view with respect to it;
that is, only as long as legal officials appeal to the rule to justify their conduct (qua
officials), and as a basis for criticizing legal officials who deviate from it (in their
capacity as legal officials). Thus a second necessary condition for the creation of a new
rule of customary international law is that the rule of recognition followed by officials in
the international legal system treat customary rules (at least in some domains of conduct)
as legally valid. Together, a customary rule and this rule of recognition are jointly
sufficient for the existence of a rule of customary international law.
With a clearer conceptual understanding of the process whereby a new rule of
customary international law comes to exist, we can now dissolve the chronological
paradox. As a conceptual matter, the agents whose beliefs in the existence of a
customary rule are necessary for the existence of that rule need not overlap at all with the
agents whose beliefs in the existence of a rule of recognition (that treats custom as a
source of law) are necessary for the legal validity of that customary rule. We can
imagine, for example, a society whose legal officials live in isolation from their subjects,
but subscribe to a rule of recognition that directs them to validate the society’s customary
rules as law. These officials have no part in the creation of the customary rule; indeed,
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qua customary rule, they may not be subject to it at all. But it is only in virtue of these
officials’ adherence to the rule of recognition specified above that the customary rule
becomes law. Likewise, while the remaining members of this society play a necessary
role in the creation of the rule, they are powerless to make that rule legally valid. Since
they are not legal officials, even their belief that the rule is law does not suffice to make it
so.16 As this imagined scenario illustrates, the creation of a new rule of customary law
(international or domestic) does not require any agent to believe that her conduct is
already legally required.17 Nor does the chronological paradox reappear at the level of
customary rule formation, since as I argued in the previous section, the development of a
new customary rule does not require that those whose beliefs are instrumental in such a
process already believe that their conduct is required by a rule.
Why, then, have so many international legal theorists thought that the creation of
new norms of customary international law suffers from the chronological paradox? A
likely answer is that they have been misled by the fact that, in the international legal
system, states comprise both the primary actors whose conduct and beliefs give rise to the
existence of a any customary rule, and the vast majority of the officials in the
international legal system whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem
that rule legally valid.18 It is easy to conflate the two distinct conceptual claims:
(1) the development of a new customary rule requires that states (in their capacity as
members of the society of states) believe in the existence of such a rule
and
(2) in order for a customary rule to be law, states (in their capacity as officials of the
international legal system) must believe that it is law
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into the single claim
(3) the development of a new customary rule of international law requires that states
believe the rule to already be law.
This claim, of course, entails the chronological paradox. While the dual roles played by
states in the international legal system may be the cause of the mistaken belief in this
paradox, it is important to note that the problem is a conceptual one. As I have
demonstrated here, once we draw the appropriate conceptual distinctions, the
chronological paradox will trouble us no more.
III
The solution to the chronological paradox presented in the previous section rests on
Hart’s analysis of the nature of law and a legal system, and in particular on the idea of a
rule of recognition. Yet when he turns in the final chapter of The Concept of Law to a
discussion of international law, Hart denies the existence of an international rule of
recognition. Furthermore, he rejects the necessity of a rule of recognition for the
existence of a genuine legal order, and so the need for an international rule of recognition
if international law is to count as genuine law. Therefore, a successful defense of my
proposed solution to the chronological paradox requires at a minimum the refutation of
the first of these two claims. Completion of this task will at least show the applicability
of my solution to the existing international legal order, even if not to all possible legal
orders (encompassing customary norms). After defending the existence of a rule of
recognition for contemporary customary international law, I conclude with a few remarks
regarding Hart’s contention that a customary legal order can exist in the absence of a rule
of recognition.
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After a brief summary of Hart’s discussion of international law, focusing in
particular on those remarks that pertain to the existence of an international rule of
recognition, I examine in the remainder of this section attempts by several international
legal scholars to rebut Hart’s claim that no such rule exists. These writers – Anthony
D’Amato, Thomas Franck, and G.J.H. van Hoof – largely fail to grasp the primary reason
behind Hart’s skepticism. Indeed, some of these authors evidence a deep
misunderstanding of Hart’s entire project, and in particular, the limited function of a rule
of recognition. In the following section, I offer a novel defense of a rule of recognition
for customary international law premised on a distinction between the ontological
function and the authoritative resolution function of such a rule, a distinction elided by
Hart’s talk of a rule of recognition serving to identify what the law is.
Hart frames his discussion of an international rule of recognition as a response to
Kelsen.19 Specifically, Hart rejects Kelsen’s insistence that any legal order, and in
particular the international legal order, must have a Grundnorm, a rule that (1) functions
to validate all other rules as rules of the legal order in question, (2) unifies these rules in a
single system, and (3) makes possible the existence of obligation creating rules. With
regard to the last of these functions alleged to show the necessity of a Grundnorm, Hart
argues that the existence of obligation creating rules amongst a group of actors requires
only that those actors adopt the internal point of view with respect to certain standards of
conduct, a state of affairs that can obtain in the absence of any ‘basic norm.’ He also
argues that it is quite possible for a legal order to consist of a mere set of rules, without
there being any secondary rule of recognition that unites them into a system of rules.
This claim entails the falsity of the second reason Kelsen gives for the necessity of a
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Grundnorm as a condition for the existence of a legal order. Finally, Hart argues that as a
conceptual matter the existence of a rule in a given society (or social order) does not
depend on its validation by a Grundnorm or rule of recognition. Rather, its acceptance
by members of that society suffices for the existence of the rule in question. In short,
neither the existence of a rule nor the capacity of that rule to impose obligations on those
subject to it requires the existence of a Grundnorm, nor does the existence of a legal
order require the systematicity a Grundnorm provides. Thus Hart concludes that no
conceptual, or a priori, argument supports Kelsen’s assertion that the international legal
order must rest on some Grundnorm. And since the rule of recognition, as Hart describes
it, serves the first two of the three functions Kelsen attributes to the Grundnorm, it
follows that the existence of a rule of recognition is not a necessary condition for the
existence of a legal order. Therefore, it is possible that the current international legal
order, or at least customary international law, does not rest on a rule of recognition. If
this is in fact the case, then the view advocated earlier does not provide a solution to the
chronological paradox for these legal orders.20
Even if Hart correctly argues that the existence of the international legal order
does not require a Grundnorm or rule of recognition, it does not follow that there is no
such norm or rule. Hart recognizes this, and therefore he does not limit himself to
criticizing Kelsen’s assumption that an international Grundnorm must exist. Instead, he
goes on to attack Kelsen’s claim to have identified the norm in question, namely that
‘states should behave as they customarily behave.’ Such a rule, Hart contends, is
redundant. A rule that says ‘you have an obligation to follow the rule that says you have
an obligation to do X’ adds nothing to the simpler rule that says ‘you have an obligation
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to do X’. Such a rule is normatively redundant, as it amounts to the assertion that an
agent has an obligation to do what he has an obligation to do. Such a rule is also
epistemically redundant; as Hart puts it, such a rule ‘is an empty repetition of the mere
fact that the society concerned (whether of individuals or states) observes certain
standards of conduct as obligatory rules.’21 It seems that the only reason to accept such a
Grundnorm would be if some basic norm were necessary for the existence of a legal
order. Insofar as Hart successfully demonstrates that the existence of an international
legal order does not depend on an international Grundnorm there is not even this reason
to accept Kelsen’s proposed rule. The same conclusion follows if we understand
Kelsen’s proposed rule as a Hartian rule of recognition, rather than as Grundnorm.
Having undermined both Kelsen’s theory of international law and his proposed
Grundnorm for the international legal order, Hart brings his discussion of international
law to a close with the claim that though ‘different interpretations of the phenomena to be
observed are of course possible… it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing
general criteria of validity for the rules of international law.’22 Though Hart endorses
Bentham’s assessment that international law is sufficiently analogous in content to
municipal law to warrant being labeled law, in its form or structure international law
remains a primitive social order.
Hart’s conclusion has not discouraged a number of international legal theorists
from attempting to use his concepts of law and a legal system to analyze international
law. However, while each has engaged to some degree with Hart’s denial of an
international rule of recognition, and his description of international law as in certain
respects a primitive social order, none appear to have fully grasped Hart’s reasons for
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drawing this conclusion. A brief review of the responses to Hart’s discussion of
international law offered by Anthony D’Amato, Thomas Franck, and G.J.H. van Hoof,
provides some evidence to support this claim.
D’Amato was among the first international legal theorists to consider the
implications of Hart’s analysis of law for the international legal order, and to criticize
Hart’s remarks on international law.23 He rightly objects to Hart’s assertion that an
international rule of recognition would exist were it to come to pass that non-party states
to multi-lateral treaties were generally viewed as being bound by those treaties:
‘Assigning international legislative consequence to multilateral conventions may be a
step in the direction of simplicity, but surely cannot be held to be the revolution which
transforms primitive international law into a complex system of modern law.’24 But
many of D’Amato’s other criticisms miss the mark. For instance, he accuses Hart of
relying on legal concepts to explain why it is that people obey the law. But Hart’s
account of how social norms create obligations (as social facts), involving the adoption of
an internal point of view with respect to certain standards of conduct, does not rely on
any specifically legal concepts. Indeed, D’Amato appears to imply that Hart’s theory of
legal obligation suffers from the chronological paradox; that even the coming into
existence of a rule of recognition requires that the relevant agents conduct themselves in
certain ways with the belief that their conduct is already legally required.25 D’Amato
suggests that international law demonstrates the falsity of such a conclusion, but as
should be clear from the discussion earlier in the process whereby conventional norms
come to exist, Hart is not committed to it anyway.
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Nor does D’Amato grant sufficient recognition to Hart’s separation of the
analytical question regarding what the law is, and the role a rule of recognition plays in
addressing that question, and normative questions such as ‘what ought the law to be?’
and ‘is there a moral obligation to obey the law?’ For example, D’Amato claims that
Hart’s analysis of a rule of recognition cannot cope with the possibility that those who
exercise the authority conferred by the rule will abuse it.26 This is only a problem,
however, if it is assumed that a legal obligation to φ entails a moral obligation to φ. Hart
explicitly denies the necessity of such an implication. Even if those empowered to create
law by the rule of recognition in a given legal system choose to create morally
problematic laws, such “abuse” need not result in immoral consequences, particularly
amongst a population well-schooled in Hart’s legal theory.27 Moreover, the kind of abuse
D’Amato has in mind – a legislator changing or manipulating the rule of recognition at
whim – are extremely unlikely, if not impossible, in a legal system with any significant
number of legal officials. In such a legal system, the rule of recognition will depend on a
consensus amongst most legal officials, and so no single legislator (or judge, etc.) will be
capable of changing the rule herself.28
Perhaps most surprisingly, D’Amato chooses not to contest at all Hart’s claim that
international law contains no rule of recognition. Rather, D’Amato appears to adopt a
different method for challenging Hart’s analysis of international law. He begins by
granting Hart’s claim, and remarking that its acceptance ‘may suggest that international
law is basically incomplete and thus deserving of less respect on the part of states than
ordinary municipal law.’29 To head off such worries, D’Amato then attempts to
demonstrate that Hart’s concept of a rule of recognition is conceptually and morally
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problematic. If successful, his criticisms might be taken to imply that the international
legal order’s lack of a rule of recognition should not be viewed as a strike against it.
Unfortunately for D’Amato, the aforementioned rebuttals to his criticisms undermine this
strategy for refuting Hart’s skepticism.30
In The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck also attempts to
rebut Hart’s claim that international law does not rest on a rule of recognition.31 Yet
Franck not only fails to identify Hart’s primary reason for reaching the skeptical
conclusion that he does, he also misinterprets the role Hart assigns a rule of recognition in
his theory of law and of a legal system. Specifically, Franck erroneously claims that the
rule of recognition plays a crucial role in generating law’s normativity.32 Whatever the
merits of Franck’s account of international law’s normativity, his discussion leaves Hart’s
skepticism unaddressed, as the following remarks illustrate.
Franck reads Hart as claiming that the validation of primary rules of obligation by
a rule of recognition adds to their legitimacy, by which he means their ‘pull to
compliance.’ For example, Franck writes that
primary rules, if they lack adherence to a system of validating secondary
rules… may well exert a pull toward compliance, but a weaker one than is
evinced by primary rules of obligation that are reinforced by a hierarchy of
secondary rules which define the rule-system’s ‘right process.’ Another
way to say this is that a rule is more likely to obligate if it is made within
the framework of an organized normative hierarchy…33
Franck’s reference to legitimacy and obligation are somewhat ambiguous here (and
throughout his book); it is often unclear whether he intends to assert a descriptive thesis –
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under such and such conditions, actors are more likely to be motivated to comply with
legal norms – or a normative thesis –under such and such conditions, states have a
reason, and perhaps even that special kind of reason known as a moral obligation, to
comply with legal norms. Hart offers a descriptive thesis of obligations as social facts; a
given norm imposes obligations when the relevant actors adopt the internal point of view
toward it, that is, when they appeal to the norm as a sufficient justification for conduct
that conforms to the norm, and for criticizing those whose conduct deviates from the
norm. But as was just noted, Hart is quite clear that it does not follow from the (social)
fact that an agent has a legal obligation to comply with a given norm that she has a moral
obligation, or indeed any reason at all, to comply with that norm. But even if these
ambiguities regarding the concepts of obligation and legitimacy are left aside, nowhere
does Hart make the claim that agents are more likely to adopt the internal point of view
with respect to a social norm (such as a law) if that norm is endorsed by a rule of
recognition. In fact, the one rule in a legal system to which actors (or at least officials)
must adopt the internal point of view is the one that cannot be given a greater ‘pull to
compliance’ through validation by a rule of recognition, namely the rule of recognition
itself.
Consider another of Franck’s attempts to characterize Hart’s theory of law, and
the role a rule of recognition plays in it.
In his [Hart’s] view, a simple rule (“cross on the green, stop on the red”)
may arise as a discrete obligation entered into consensually by an
otherwise unassociated group of actors: for example, random pedestrians
and motorists. But that obligation’s compliance pull would be enhanced if
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the traffic rule has been made by a city council organized in accordance
with a state constitution which, itself, is a valid exercise of powers
allocated to the state by the national constitution. Primary obligations
such as those imposed by the traffic rule may come into operation as mere
reciprocal arrangements, lacking adherence to a system of secondary rules
about how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied. Such ad hoc
rules are not necessarily incapable of obligating parties which have agreed
to abide by them. But rules which adhere to a hierarchy of secondary
rules are of a higher order of obligation because they can exert a pull
toward compliance even on parties which have not specifically agreed to
comply. The basis of an obligation created by a primary rule which is
reinforced by a rule hierarchy is not specific consent but status.34
This paragraph contains the same problems as those identified previously: ambiguity with
respect to the concept of obligation, and the attribution to secondary rules, including the
rule of recognition, of a normativity generating power that Hart does not assign them.
But it evidences an additional misunderstanding of Hart’s view as well.
Franck places great weight here (and elsewhere) on the distinction between
specific consent or agreement on the one hand, and status as a member of the community
on the other, as a basis for being bound by law. Apparently he believes that a rule of
recognition is both necessary and sufficient for the latter being a possible source of
obligation. Hart would deny this, however. Conceptually, nothing prevents an agent
from becoming bound by a primary norm even if she has not specifically consented to it,
and this is so even if no rule exists in the community for identifying what the law is, and
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for systematizing it – that is, even in the absence of a rule of recognition as Hart
conceives of it. Primary rules (and even some secondary rules, such as rudimentary
norms of contract) exist and apply to all members of a community as long as most of its
members believe they do. It is consensus, not consent, that provides the basis for social
norms; that is why new entrants to the community (agents born into it, or newly created
states) are automatically bound by these norms, regardless of whether they agree to be.
Of course, the consensus amongst a given group of agents may be that certain norms are
binding only on those who specifically consent to them; but whether this is so, and for
what norms, is a contingent matter that will likely vary from community to community.
Nor is a rule of recognition, as Hart understands it, necessary to define
membership in the community. Membership does depend on a consensus within a group
regarding who counts as a member; but such a consensus can exist even in the absence of
any mechanism for authoritatively resolving who is, and who is not, a member of the
community. Of course, except in the conditions that Hart describes as necessary for the
survival of a primitive social order (e.g. ties of kinship and a stable environment),
uncertainty is likely to arise regarding the exact criteria for membership, which may well
lead in turn to disruptions of social order. A rule of recognition will help to address this
defect, but it is not necessary for the existence of any community at all, even a
community of groups or collective agents.35
It is important to note the exact nature of the criticisms leveled here against
Franck. Primarily, I aim to demonstrate that Franck misunderstands the task Hart assigns
a rule of recognition in his theory of law and of a legal system, and therefore Franck’s
remarks do not constitute a rebuttal of Hart’s skepticism with respect to the existence of
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an international rule of recognition. Whether states are bound by (some) international
legal norms because of their membership in the international (legal) community, or
because they have specifically agreed to be bound by these norms, makes no difference to
Hart’s claim that there exists no criterion for identifying what the law is except the beliefs
of states. It is uncertainty over what the law is, and not the descriptive or normative basis
of legal obligation, that Hart contends a rule of recognition addresses. Even if Franck
makes an important contribution to the latter issue, his discussion leaves Hart’s
skepticism regarding an international rule of recognition intact.
To my knowledge, G.J.H. van Hoof displays the most sophisticated grasp of
Hart’s theory by an international legal scholar.36 Van Hoof clearly understands Hart’s
analysis of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, the function that
Hart believes the rule of recognition plays in a legal system, and what distinguishes
Hart’s theory of law from natural law and both Austin’s and Kelsen’s brands of
positivism. But like D’Amato and Franck, van Hoof does not clearly perceive the
primary reason behind Hart’s assertion that the international legal order does not rest on a
rule of recognition.
Consider van Hoof’s critique of Hart. First, he asserts that ‘no grounds [for
denying the existence of a rule of recognition] are adduced and Hart’s view in this respect
cannot really be called a conclusion; it is rather a presumption.’37 Second, van Hoof
chastises Hart for failing to conduct an empirical search for an international rule of
recognition, as he appears to believe that Hart has done in the case of municipal legal
systems (specifically, the English and U.S. legal systems).38 Third, Hart is accused of
making contradictory claims regarding international law. On the one hand, he describes
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the international legal order as ‘simple’ and ‘primitive,’ while on the other hand he
acknowledges that international law is in many ways more like a municipal legal system
than a ‘small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief,
placed in a stable environment.’39 Fourth, van Hoof claims that when he turns to
international law, Hart’s approach becomes more restrictive; in particular, Hart ‘implies
that a rule of recognition requires the existence of a legislature.’40
What truth, if any, is there to these criticisms? With regard to van Hoof’s third
objection, the answer is none. He identifies as a ‘remarkable contradiction’ Hart’s claim
that ‘in form, international law resembles such a [primitive] regime of primary rules,
even though the content of its often elaborate rules are very unlike those of a primitive
society, and many of its concepts, methods, and techniques are the same as those of
modern municipal law.’41 Yet this statement is not a contradiction; it merely asserts that
despite certain similarities of function and content, there is a formal or structural
difference between municipal legal orders and the international one, namely that in the
former legal validity is bestowed by conformity to a rule of recognition, while this is not
so in the latter case. International law resembles (but is not equivalent to) a primitive
social order in that it suffers the same problems of uncertainty with respect to identifying
norms and their scope that plagues such an order. In sum, careful attention to exactly
what feature of the international legal order Hart is describing as resembling a primitive
social order or a municipal legal system reveals that his claims produce no contradiction.
Van Hoof’s first two criticisms overlap somewhat, insofar as he appears to
believe that Hart ought to have provided empirical grounds to support his statement if he
wished to advance it as a conclusion. In one respect, van Hoof is correct; since a rule of
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recognition is a social fact, the non-existence of such a rule can only be demonstrated by
an exhaustive empirical study. Yet Hart is clearly aware of this, as he writes that ‘once
we emancipate ourselves from the [i.e. Kelsen’s] assumption that international law must
contain a basic rule, the question to be faced is one of fact. What is the actual character
of the rules as they function in the relations between states?’42 Why, then, does Hart not
engage in an exhaustive empirical search of the type he and van Hoof appear to agree is
necessary? The likely reason is that though Hart couches his discussion in general terms,
his primary (and perhaps even sole) focus is Kelsen’s theory of international law.43 Hart
may well have been more concerned with differentiating his theory of law from Kelsen’s
– that is, with a theoretical debate – than with the particular question of international law.
Given that aim, establishing the possibility of a legal order without a Grundnorm or rule
of recognition was a far more important task than establishing whether there was (or is)
an international rule of recognition.
But even if this explains why Hart does not make any effort to examine the
practices constitutive of international law for signs of a rule of recognition, it does not
justify his bald assertion that ‘there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity
for the rules of international law, and… the rules which are in fact operative constitute
not a system but a set of rules…’44 Yet Hart’s claim is not mere assertion, as van Hoof
would have it. For though Hart does not take on the extremely difficult task of proving a
negative – in this case, the non-existence of an international rule of recognition – he does
provide a crucial reason for thinking that no search will turn up such a rule. According to
Hart, a legal order rests on a rule of recognition only when there are criteria for settling
what the law is other than the current beliefs of those subject to the laws. Insofar as the
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existence and scope of international legal norms is simply and entirely a matter of
consensus amongst states, as international legal positivists assert, it appears to follow that
the international legal order does not rest on a rule of recognition. Van Hoof may be
right, then, to describe Hart’s claim as a presumption, rather than a conclusion.
Nevertheless, it appears to be a presumption that international legal theorists, or at least
those persuaded of the truth of Hart’s legal positivism, have good reason to take
seriously.
To reiterate, Hart’s assertion that there is no international rule of recognition rests
on a conceptual point regarding the necessary conditions for the existence of such a rule,
together with a widely (though not unanimously) accepted view of international law.
Among the passages providing textual support for this claim is Hart’s remark that, were it
generally recognized that certain treaties bind even those states not party to them,
such treaties would in fact be legislative enactments and international law
would have distinct criteria of validity for its rules. A basic rule of
recognition could then be formulated which would represent an actual
feature of the system and would be more than an empty restatement of the
fact that a set of rules are in fact observed by states.45
Van Hoof interprets this statement as implying that a rule of recognition exists only
insofar as a legislature does, a far more restrictive understanding than Hart employs when
he first introduces the concept of a rule of recognition.46 Hart’s remark does not have the
implication van Hoof believes it does, however. Rather, it depicts one possible, but not
necessary, change to the international legal order that would suffice for the existence of
an international rule of recognition.47 Seen in the context of other remarks Hart makes in
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his rebuttal of Kelsen’s theory of international law, what Hart’s statement does imply is
that a legal order has no rule of recognition if the legal validity of a norm is solely a
matter of its acceptance as law by most of those subject to it. The significance of states
being legally bound by treaties to which they are not parties lies in the possibility of a
norm being legally valid even if it is not thought to be so by those subject to it, just as in a
municipal legal system the legal validity of a norm does not depend on the belief of most,
or even all, of the persons subject to it.
Like D’Amato and Franck, van Hoof fails to provide a convincing rebuttal to
Hart’s claim that the international legal order lacks a rule of recognition. Equally
important is that all three miss the primary source of Hart’s skepticism, namely that a rule
of recognition exists only where there is an authoritative procedure in place for settling
disputes over what the law is (including the exact scope of specific legal norms). In the
next section, I argue that serving this function is not essential for the existence of a rule of
recognition, and contend that existing international law, and more specifically, customary
international law, can and does have a rule of recognition at its base.
IV
Though Hart focuses specifically on Kelsen’s theory of international law, his argument
can be stated in more general terms. First, a rule of recognition is not necessary for the
existence of a (customary) legal order. It is enough that most or all of the relevant actors
(e.g. the members of the society in question) accept norms N1, N2, etc., as legal norms.
Note that it makes no difference if the relevant actors have different reasons for accepting
N1, N2, etc., as legal norms; for instance, if one actor thinks these norms are legal
because they are substantively just, while another actor thinks they are legal because
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some third actor has pronounced them legal, and so on. Regardless of the different
reasons these actors have for believing that N is a legal norm, all will agree that when
someone violates the norm, that agent acts illegally. The fact that in the (most) primitive
legal order agents can have different reasons for believing that N1, N2, etc. are legal
norms is a crucial point to which I return below.
Second, a rule of recognition serves both an identification function and a unifying
(and perhaps more importantly, a systematizing) function in those legal orders that have
such a rule. A rule that serves these functions ameliorates one of the basic defects of a
primitive legal system, namely uncertainty with respect to what the law is (addressed by
the identification function) or with respect to the scope of particular legal norms
(addressed by the systematizing function). It does so by providing a procedure for the
authoritative resolution of debates over these questions. According to Hart, then, a legal
order contains a rule of recognition only when officials of that order adhere to a rule that
serves these functions; that is, playing these roles is essential to the existence of a rule of
recognition. Insofar as no authoritative procedure exists for resolving disputes over what
counts as a valid norm of customary international law, or over the scope of particular
customary legal norms, it follows that customary international law lacks a rule of
recognition. It is in this technical sense a primitive legal order. For just as ‘in the simpler
form of society we must wait and see whether a rule gets accepted as a rule or not,’
disputes over customary international legal norms end only once states reach a
consensus.48
I suggest that in his discussion of a rule of recognition’s identification function,
Hart elides an important distinction between what I will label the ontological function
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and the authoritative resolution function of such a rule. The former makes possible the
kind of justification and criticism constitutive of a rule-governed practice for identifying
norms as legally valid. The latter makes possible the settling of disputes over what the
law is, as well as over the scope of particular legal norms. I contend that it suffices for
the existence of a rule of recognition that it serves the ontological function; serving the
authoritative resolution function is not essential for the existence of such a rule. Existing
customary international law rests on a rule with just these features; that is, one that serves
the ontological, but not the authoritative resolution, function. That rule is ‘X is a
customary legal norm if most states believe it is a customary legal norm, and what makes
it a customary legal norm is that most states believe it is a customary legal norm.’ The
second-phrase here is crucial because it distinguishes a mere convergence of beliefs that
N is a legally valid norm, as in the hypothetical social order described in the first
paragraph of this section, from one in which belief in the legal validity of N is ruleguided. The following example both serves to illustrate this point and to make the case
that the proposed rule of recognition really does form the basis for contemporary
customary international law.
Imagine a scenario in which a state serving on the United Nations Security
Council – say the United Kingdom – decides to vote against a proposal to condemn as
illegal state A’s intervention in state B (where neither A nor B is the United Kingdom).
Suppose that the United Kingdom offers as a justification for its vote its belief that state
A has not acted illegally because its conduct conforms to a norm that is legal because it is
just. That is, the U.K. justifies its vote by appeal to the belief that the substantive justice
of the norm suffices for that norm’s legal validity. Surely much of the criticism directed
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at the U.K. would involve substantive arguments concerning the justice of this particular
intervention, the effects that a rule legalizing interventions of this type would have on
international peace and stability, and so on. I suggest, however, that the U.K. would also
be criticized for deviating from the existing shared normative practice governing the legal
validation of norms, namely the recognition of norms as legally valid by most states. In
other words, the U.K. would be criticized for deviating from the international rule of
recognition (at least as concerns customary international law, and perhaps also treaty
law), and those who made the criticism would take the fact of deviation from this rule to
be a sufficient reason for criticizing the U.K.; that is, a reason to criticize the U.K.
independent of any substantive concerns regarding justice or international peace and
stability.
Of course it is possible to criticize those who object to the U.K.’s deviation; that
is, to argue that the U.K. (and other states) ought not to adhere to the rule of recognition
that forms the basis of customary international law because adherence to a different rule
of recognition would lead to more substantively just outcomes. But the existence of a
rule of recognition does not turn on whether such a rule, and the legal order to which it
gives rise, produces peace or justice (though some degree of stability is probably
necessary). Thus it is one thing to criticize those who object to the U.K.’s deviation by
arguing that morally the U.K., in its role as an official of the international legal order,
ought not to adhere to the existing rule of recognition.49 That criticism is distinct,
however, from (the possibility of) the kind of criticism that follows from the existence of
a rule of recognition; namely criticism for deviation from the rule. Note that no such

28

criticism can be made in a legal order where the common belief in the legal validity of
certain norms results only from a fortunate overlap of beliefs.
In sum, I claim that we can infer from actual and likely counter-factual state
conduct that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that states the
existence conditions for customary international legal norms. States rely on this rule in
distinguishing mere customary international norms (or usage) from norms of customary
international law (or custom); that N is a norm of customary international law is not
merely a matter of common belief, but adherence to a shared normative standard for legal
validity. True, this rule does not contribute to the amelioration of the problem Hart
focused on in his discussion of the rule of recognition; there is no less uncertainty in
customary international law than there would be in the absence of the proposed rule. In
that respect, customary international law remains primitive and its rule of recognition
defective, and so the argument here does not constitute a direct rebuttal of Hart’s
skepticism regarding an international rule of recognition. But serving the authoritative
resolution function is not essential to the existence of a rule of recognition, and it is only
the existence of such a rule for contemporary customary international law that my
proposed solution to the chronological paradox requires.
While the foregoing argument demonstrates that existing customary international
law rests on a rule of recognition, it may not suffice to prove that customary law
(international or otherwise) can exist only in the presence of a rule of recognition.
Whether it is thought to entail this stronger conclusion will depend in part on one’s
assessment of the primitive social order described earlier, in which there is an overlap of
beliefs regarding the legality of certain norms, though these beliefs have different bases.
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If such a legal order counts as customary, then a rule of recognition, even one that serves
only the ontological function, is not necessary for the existence of a customary legal
order. If, on the other hand, the reader’s intuition is that this order is not a customary
legal order (perhaps because it does not rest on any shared convention regarding legal
validity), then this may lend some support for the strong claim that a conceptually
necessary condition for the creation of a new rule of customary international law is that
officials in the international legal system adhere to a rule of recognition that treats
customary rules (at least in some domain D) as legally valid.50
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